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Any opinions expressed here are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Federal Open Market Committee participants.THIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
CROSSROADS
The fallout from the ﬁnancial turmoil of 2008 and 2009 is placing
the Fed at a crossroads on three dimensions:
1 The political independence of the Fed is at risk.
2 Regulatory reform legislation threatens to hamstring the Fed’s
ability to respond to a future crisis.
3 The Fed adopted a near-zero interest rate policy and successfully
carried out its stabilization policy through quantitative easing.THIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
Main Street, Wall Street,
and
WashingtonTHIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
THE NATION’S THIRD ATTEMPT AT A CENTRAL BANK
The ﬁrst two central banks in the U.S. were discontinued.
The nation had no central bank during most of the 19th century.
The evidence from the 19th century is generally regarded as
unfavorable.
There was far too much ﬁnancial instability: The economy was
characterized by repeated, serious panics.
Contemporaries were dissatisﬁed.
Monetary stability was a major political issue in the late 19th
century.
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THE FOUNDING OF THE FED
The Federal Reserve has three parts.
Washington: Board of Governors.
New York: One bank in the nation’s ﬁnancial capital.
Main Street: Eleven banks in the rest of the nation.
The regional structure was designed to keep some power out of
New York and Washington.
It allows for input on key policy questions from around the U.S.A.
This system has been very successful.
The current crisis has created a loud protest from the nation.
It would be ironic indeed if the response to that protest were to
further centralize power in New York and Washington.THIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
ULTIMATE AUTHORITY IN WASHINGTON
The Board of Governors members are appointed by the President
and conﬁrmed by the Senate.
The Board of Governors has oversight authority for the Fed.
This includes budget authority.
It also includes authority over key appointments in the Fed.
This means Presidents, First Vice-Presidents, as well as the Chair
and Vice-Chair of the Board of Directors at each Bank.
There is considerable accountability in the Roosevelt-era
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ACCOUNTABILITY
Monetary policy is vigorously debated everyday, both inside and
outside the Fed.
The Fed is extensively audited—our rough estimate is about
425,000 hours annually:
Internal audit function.
Board of Governors oversight.
External auditor (Deloitte).
Each hour of audit time requires staff time for compliance.
In addition, the Fed is subject to auditing by the GAO, the
investigative arm of Congress.
Additional audits are welcome, so long as they do not constitute
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ARMS LENGTH FROM POLITICS
The Board members are appointed to staggered 14-year terms.
Actual tenure of most Board members in recent years has tended
to be much shorter than 14 years, limiting the effectiveness of
this provision.
This has placed the Fed closer to day-to-day politics than the
intent of the law.
Politics ebbs and ﬂows.
If political shifts translate into monetary policy, the result is more
and unnecessary volatility in the U.S. economy.THIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE WITH CENTRAL
BANK INDEPENDENCE
Allowing short-term politics to mix too closely with monetary
policy leads to poor economic outcomes.
This has occurred frequently in the developing world over the
past 50 years ...
... and long before that.
In the U.S., erosion of Fed independence could result in a
1970s-style period of volatility.
The consequences for the U.S. and the global economy would be
large.
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THE FED AND BANKING SUPERVISION
The U.S. has a primary regulator system for the nation’s 8,000+
commercial banks and thrifts.
The primary regulator has the key authority for the regulation of
the bank.
As of January 2007:
The Fed had primary regulatory responsibility for about 12 percent
of the banks.
About 14 percent by assets.
More than 85 percent of banks and assets had non-Fed primary
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THE FED AND THE FINANCIAL LANDSCAPE
Banks are only one part of the ﬁnancial landscape.
As the crisis began, 20 ﬁrms accounted for about 80 percent of
S&P 500 ﬁnancial sector assets in the U.S.
About 1/3 of this total was in banks.
About 2/3 of this total was non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms:
Government-sponsored enterprises (Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac), investment banks, insurance companies, and thrifts.THIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
THE FED WITH BLINDERS ON
Non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms turned out to be the most troublesome
entities in this crisis.
The Fed had no supervisory authority over these entities:
Investment banks like Goldman Sachs and Bear Stearns.
Insurance companies like Prudential and AIG.
Financial hybrids like GE Capital and GMAC.
The Fed had blinders on coming into the crisis:
Primary regulatory authority for only some of the banks, and none
of the troublesome non-bank ﬁnancials.
Bottom line: The Fed had a severely limited view of the ﬁnancial
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THE CRISIS UNFOLDS
As the crisis began, all eyes turned to the Fed as the lender of last
resort.
This always happens in a crisis—only the central bank can play
the lender-of-last-resort role.
But the Fed had detailed knowledge only of part of the ﬁnancial
landscape: that for which it had supervisory authority.
The Fed had severely limited access to information on
institutions outside its supervisory authority, especially
non-bank ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
Many of the critical lending decisions involved the controversial
non-bank ﬁnancials like Bear Stearns.THIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
THE REFORM RESPONSE
The clear lesson is that the Fed had insufﬁcient access to
information about the ﬁnancial landscape going into the crisis.
Neither the Fed nor anyone else fully understood the potential
for feedback between the ﬁnancial sector and the rest of the
economy.
Yet, the Fed will also be at the center of all future crises because
of its lender-of-last-resort role.
The reform response should be to provide the Fed with an
appropriately broad regulatory authority, so that the central
bank is well-informed about the entire ﬁnancial landscape.
A future Fed, with an appropriately broad regulatory responsibility,
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SMALLER BANK REGULATION REMAINS IMPORTANT
Regulation works well for the thousands of smaller banks in the
U.S.
The system features deposit insurance plus prudential
regulation.
The system allows failure, but prevents bank runs and the
associated panic.
Smaller banks did not cause the crisis and do not need to be
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THE FED AND SMALLER BANK REGULATION
Changing this part of the regulatory environment as we are
trying to cope with high ﬁnancial stress makes little sense.
The FDIC has been pushed to its funding limits by the crisis.
The Fed should remain involved with smaller bank regulation so
that it has a view of the entire ﬁnancial landscape and does not
become biased toward the large, mostly New York-based
institutions.
One critical role of regulation is to provide a level, competitive
playing ﬁeld for institutions of all sizes.
Smaller banks tend to fund smaller businesses, an important
source of job growth for the economy.
Understanding this process helps the Fed make sound monetary
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Monetary Policy by Different MeansTHIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
THREE PARTS TO CURRENT MONETARY POLICY
Liquidity programs, which are now mostly ended.
A near-zero interest rate policy.
A quantitative easing policy.THIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
NEAR-ZERO POLICY RATES
Policy rates were reduced to near-zero across the Group of Seven
in late 2008 and early 2009.
The FOMC has said it will keep the federal rate funds target
near-zero “for an extended period.”
Any movement on this is contingent on both inﬂation and real
economic developments.
How should the FOMC conduct stabilization policy during the
period of near-zero policy rates?
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THE NEW FACE OF STABILIZATION POLICY
The Fed is very capable of conducting stabilization policy when
policy rates are near zero.
The quantitative policy should be conducted in a manner
analogous to interest rate policy.
This means adjusting the policy according to incoming
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OUTRIGHT ASSET PURCHASES
The FOMC has announced more than $1.7 trillion in outright
asset purchases.
The purchases are in agency debt, agency MBS, and longer-term
Treasuries.
This is being ﬁnanced by reserve creation: “printing money.”
The monetary base has expanded rapidly.
In contrast to the liquidity programs, the expansion of the
monetary base associated with the asset purchase program is
likely to be very persistent.
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THE MEDIUM-TERM INFLATION RISK
Very large increases in the monetary base are inﬂationary under
ordinary monetary theory.
The actual effects depend on at least two factors.
One factor: Private sector expectations of the future level of the
monetary base.
Large increases that are expected to be temporary, as with the
liquidity programs, are not inﬂationary.
Large increases that are expected to be more persistent may be
inﬂationary.
The increase in the base associated with asset purchases is more
persistent.
A second factor: The speed with which the monetary base is
translated into changes in the money supply.
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THE COMPOSITION OF FEDERAL RESERVE ASSETSTHIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
ASSET PURCHASES AS QUANTITATIVE EASING
The asset purchase program began in January 2009.
The program substituted for additional easing that could not be
accomplished through the policy rate.
It is generally considered successful in further easing monetary
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MORTGAGE RATESTHIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
ConclusionsTHIS TALK FED STRUCTURE REGULATORY REFORM MONETARY POLICY BY DIFFERENT MEANS CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
The Fed’s structure was designed to keep some power out of
Washington and New York.
The reform response should be to provide the Fed with an
appropriately broad regulatory authority, so that the central
bank is well-informed about the entire ﬁnancial landscape.
The ﬁnancial landscape includes the nation’s smaller banks, and
the Fed should continue to play a key role as a regulator for this
group.
A future Fed, with an appropriately broad regulatory
responsibility, may be able to head off a future crisis.
The Fed’s quantitative easing program has shown that
stabilization policy can be carried out effectively even when
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